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Abstract: The relationship between firms and environment is complex. The 
impact that firms have on the environment include the use of primary resources 
to make products and the production of wastes and emissions. The impact of 
firms’ products on the environment, moreover, is not negligible. Environmental 
laws cannot, and should not, prescribe every decision taken by every business. 
Rather, consideration of environmental issues should be part of good business 
practice.  Firms  have,  in  fact,  more  than  one  reason  for  adopting 
environmentally responsible behaviour. This paper surveys the literature that 
analyze  the  circumstances  under  which  firms  can  reconcile  the  apparently 
competing  goals  of  increasing  the  expected  value  of  their  activity  and 
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In a most basic understanding, the sole responsibility of the firm is to increase its 
profit within the framework set by the formal laws of the State(s) in which it operates. 
This is the well-known Friedman (1970) point of view. The argument can be traced 
back  to  Adam  Smith.  The  responsibility  of  the  firm  is  to  create  value  that  can  be 
distributed to the wider society through the appropriation mechanisms of the market, 
mainly through prices set by supply and demand. Thus, the deviance of firms from the 
narrow economic objectives is not only harmful to the firms themselves but also to the 
wider society (Friedman, 1990). 
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Firms experience formal and informal demands for change. Even if changes are 
costly to the them, they can take place for at least two reasons. On one hand they can 
allow  firm  to  keep  a  positive  reputation  and  on  the  other  hand  they  can  be  a 
consequence of its bounded rationality. 
The ability to keep a positive reputation in society can, in some circumstances, be 
vital for a firm’s ability to obtain and keep a “licence to operate”, licence vital for the 
ability to return a profit. The reputation management approach sees reputation of the 
firm as a sort of capital, which represents the financial value of its intangible assets 
(Fombrun, 1996).  
Firms, as individuals, have a rationality that is ‘bounded’ (Simon, 1976). Choices 
under  uncertainty  could  induce  them  to  consider  doing  what  others  do  the  safest 
strategy.  This  can  be  seen  as  a  strategy  of  satisfying  (Cyert  and  March,  1963). 
Therefore, if some firms engage in socially responsible activities with success, others 
are likely to change their previous strategy and to follow.  
In the ideal world of economic theory, without market failures, maximizing profits 
leads the economy to a Pareto efficient outcome good for society. In contrast, in the real 
world there are differences between the private and social costs of making and using 
products  and  services.  Non-alignment  can  be  often  costly  and  damaging  to  the 
corporation. According to Heal (2007), corporations over-comply to internalize external 
effects - something that they find in their long-term interests because it reduces the 
sources of conflict between them and society.  
If environmental externalities  were the only departure  from the assumptions  of 
perfect competition and if no firm had preferential access to superior stocks of natural 
resources, it would be impossible to internalize costs voluntarily without losing one’s 
customers  or  selling  output  at  a  loss.  But  where  externalities  coexist  with  other 
departures  from  the  competitive  paradigm  –  such  as  asymmetric  information  and 
oligopoly – a firm may be able to increase its expected value through the voluntary 
internalization of negative external effects (Reinhardt, 1999). 
In fact a number of firms, especially in Europe and North America, assert that they 
are pursuing beyond compliance environmental policies (Smart, 1992).                                                                                                                                                 
To investigate corporate motivations for pursuing over compliance and analyze 
the impact of socially responsible initiatives on company performance might help to 
visualize  the  linkage  between  motivations  and  results  of  undertaking  socially 
responsible practices along both ethical and economic dimensions.   
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Firms, as said, may find in their shareholder’s interests to internalize external costs 
to a greater degree than required by law. The economically rationale explanations for 
such  firm’s  policy  can  be  found  in  two  strands  of  literature
1:  the  Corporate  Social 
Responsibility  (CSR)  literature  that  explains  why  firms  assume  social  responsibility 
going  beyond  compliance  with  laws  and  regulations  and  the  voluntary  agreements 
literature.  The  two  strands  of  literature  we  are  going  to  review,  analyze  the 
circumstances  under  which  firms  can  reconcile  the  apparently  competing  goals  of 
increasing its profit and increasing the provision of environmentally friendly goods. 
One explanation for such policy is that it increases the expected value of the firm. 
Therefore, it increases expected revenues or lowers expected costs. On the revenues side, 
the firm might be interested in reducing the probability or magnitude of revenue losses 
(due to boycotts or to changes in consumer tastes), or it may be interested in capturing a 
price premium for its products. On the costs side, the firm might aim at reducing the 
prices or the quantity of inputs that it must purchase, or at reducing the probability or 
magnitude of losses arising from possible future regulation or litigation. 
CSR  drivers  can  be  generally  categorized  as  either  market  forces  or  political 
forces.  Market  forces  include  win/win  opportunity  to  cut  costs  by  improving  the 
efficiency of resources use; green consumers willing to reward firms that over comply 
by  redirecting  their  demand  towards  these  firms  (Arora  and  Gangopadhyay,  1995); 
labour market advantages with employees who have green preferences; reduced cost of 
capital from green investors. The firms’ decisions of going beyond compliance with law 
in order to reduce the risk of tighter regulation or to induce the government to choose a 
form of regulation more favourable to them (Segerson and Miceli, 1999; Maxwell, Lyon 
and Hackett, 2000; and Lutz, Lyon and Maxwell, 2000) are included in the political 
forces. Some of these forces, as we will see, drive the adoption of voluntary agreements 
as well. 
                                                
1  The  so  called  “no  regret  potion”  is  the  focal  point  of  a  third  strand  of  literature.  According  this 
literature,  many  firms  behave  as  though  free  lunches  exist.Their  objective  is  to  identify  and  lessen 
environmental  impacts  while  saving  money.  The  existence  of  a  free  lunch  depends  on  market 
imperfections and on difficulties in monitoring managers who may be pursuing their own agendas. If 
competition is imperfect and if information does not flow freely within the firm, it may be possible for 
cost savings to go unexploited (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Tirole, 1988). Bréchet and Jouvet (2009) 
show that pollution abatement is costly but that implementing internal environmental management may 
lead to increases in factors'  productivity. When comparing situations with and without environmental 
management, a firm may gain from going green, which is a no-regret option. 
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The  use  of  voluntary  agreements  can  in  fact  be  justified  in  several  cases.  The 
common denominator of these cases is the presence of inefficiencies, market failures and 
strategic behaviour related to imperfect competition in the product market. 
Factors such as the managerial altruism, the emergence of a new generation of 
savvier business leaders who take pro-active steps to avert political conflict should not 
be disregarded. Voluntary actions internalizing environmental externalities seem to be 
socially  responsible.  However  Maxwell  and  Lyon  (2008)  raise,  between  others,  the 
following question: it is socially desirable for managers to take costly environmental 
initiatives at the expense of shareholders? 
The welfare effects of CSR are difficult to establish and have not received a lot of 
scholarly attention. Nevertheless, the literature provides some insights into the welfare 
effects
2 of strategic CSR
3. 
This paper aims to individuate the circumstances under which environmental over 
compliance  might  be  sensible  from  the  firm’s  point  of  view.  At  this  purpose,  it  is 
organized as follows: Section 2 investigates on negative externalities and regulation. 
Section 3 analyzes the corporate motivations for taking part in CSR practices along both 
ethical and economic dimensions.  The  voluntary agreement literature is analysed  in 
section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Negative externalities and weaknesses of regulation 
The perfect competition conditions, according to economic theory, assure the absence of 
dissociation between the economic and social frontiers of the firm. If the enterprise 
succeeded  in  best  serving  the  interest  of  all  its  stakeholders  by  focusing  on  the 
maximization of its profits and optimizing its process of production, than it operates 
under those conditions. 
Given this absence of dissociation between the economic and social frontiers and 
given that market and the governments regulate the firm, the responsibilities of this 
latter have been considered, generally, of a legal rather than social character.  
                                                
2  Some  scholars  have  questioned  the  CSR  welfare  effects  on  the  basis  of  political  and  economic  arguments 
(Friedman, 1970; Henderson, 2001; Reich, 2007) but these arguments have not always been addressed by others. 
3 There exists three types of CSR namely: ethical, altruistic, and strategic. Lantos (2001), for example, argues that for 
any organization, ethical CSR (avoiding societal harms) is obligatory. For a publicly-held business, altruistic CSR 
(doing good works at possible expense to stockholders) is “not legitimate,” and that companies should limit their 
philanthropy to strategic CSR (good works that are also good for the business). 
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Even if, in theory - at the moment when it is solely preoccupied with its economic 
boundaries - the firm contributes to the general welfare, numerous economists have 
noted that in practice the market mechanisms are unable to best serve the welfare of all 
stakeholders (Cornes and Stander, 1999). In many situations the market demonstrates its 
failures in this regard.  
These failures which were identified in the beginning of the twentieth century by 
welfare  economists  are,  as  it  is  known,  called  negative  externalities.  A  negative 
externality or a negative external effect designates the fact that  in the course of its 
process of production and thus in its creation of value the firm transfers some costs onto 
its environment and stakeholders (Papandreou, 1994). The “social costs” or external 
costs designate costs which are necessary to the creation of value but which are not 
assumed  by  the  producer  (Coase,  1960;  1988),  they  are  rather  sustained  by  the 
stakeholders. A portion of the profit generated by the firm is earned to the detriment of 
the stakeholders. 
On the one hand the transfer of social and environmental costs on stakeholders is 
an endemic firms’ practice. On the other hand, environmental quality is a determinant of 
well-being and an important policy issue. In response to poor environmental conditions, 
in many countries, environmental policies and regulations have been implemented to 
improve them
4. 
From the beginning of the 1980s, firms brought about a radical mutation in their 
processes  of  production:  they  decentralised  and  globalized.  Because  of  this  double 
transformation market and governments have become incapable of reducing the gap 
between the economic and social boundaries of the firm. As a result a reflux of “social 
cost” is imposed on the stakeholders.  
Government intervention designed to correct market failures leads to corruption 
and inefficiencies
5 in many developing countries and in advanced economies as well
6. 
As it is known, firms sometimes use the familiar tools of campaign contributions and 
lobbying to influence and or to delay future regulations. 
                                                
4 The last three decades have seen the establishment of numerous international norms and standards for 
environmental protection. These have generally taken the form of treatises, conventions and multilateral 
environmental  agreements  (MEAs).  It  is  unlikely  that  the  implementation  of  much  MEAs  will  be 
achieved through public initiative alone (Siegele and Ward, 2007). 
5 The presence of government corruption is interpreted by some social scientists as evidence that most 
politicians try  to  further  their  career  or wealth  rather  than  correct  market  failures (e.g. Shleifer  and 
Vishny, 1994).  
6 See De Soto (1989) on corruption and Lal (1985) on misallocation of resources.  
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Even when regulations have been promulgated by politicians well intentioned, in 
absence  of lobbying activities, they are unlikely  to have much impact on  corporate 
behaviour unless government undertakes costly monitoring and enforcement activities
7. 
Regulatory agencies are chronically underfounded, therefore regulators must carefully 
allocate their enforcement resources. As a result, companies viewed by regulators as 
socially responsible are likely to be monitored less frequently. This is not exactly a good 
result for social welfare. 
It is true that states can, for instance, tax firms that pollute excessively. Compared 
to reputational effects, which may indirectly harm corporate profits, the use of fiscal 
powers  can  reduce  or  increase  profits  directly,  thus  constituting  a  potentially  high 
powered incentive device. However, it is true too that states often fail. 
 The institutional weaknesses favour the emission of negative externalities and 
thus unprecedented possibilities for maximization of profit. It seems that civil society 
has  organized itself in order to  reduce social costs. In response  to the weakness  of 
market and governments, new institutions have indeed emerged. Alongside the legal 
responsibilities  enforced  by  market  and  governments,  the  new  institutions  define  a 
group of responsibilities with an uncertain character which are designated as “social”. 
The firms themselves appear to be the motive forces of the process of internalization of 
social costs.  
When the regulator lacks information about the costs of alternative policies, for 
example, the CSR can play an important informational role. As shown by Denicolò 
(2003), for example, a firm’s voluntary adoption of a clean technology can signal to the 
regulator that the cost of adoption is low. Consequently the regulator may find socially 
desirable to mandate the adoption of a clean technology. 
Obviously  a  CSR  initiative’s  (or  a  voluntary  agreement’s)  range  of  action  is 
restricted respect to that of a law. An environmental law, for instance, applies to all 
firms of a certain size. Health and safety laws apply to all firms operating certain types 
of facilities. CSR measures cannot claim the same degree of coverage. Indeed, they 
generally apply to only a subset of (self-selecting) firms: they are initiative based on 
voluntarism.  
 
                                                
7  Acemoglu  and  Verdier  (2000)  develop  a  framework  to  analyze  the  links  between  government 
interventions and government failures. They assume that: government intervention requires the use of 
agents (e.g. regulators) to collect information, make decisions, and implement policies and that these 
agents are self-interested and, by virtue of their superior information, hard to monitor perfectly. 
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3. The Corporate Social Responsibility  
From  the  well-known  Friedman  (1970)  point  of  view,  the  Corporate  Social 
Responsibility (CSR) is clearly irresponsible: any expenditure on CSR activities will put 
the  company  at  a  competitive  disadvantage  and  so  result  in  a  negative  relationship 
between these activities and market performance.  
In fact, the CSR literature emerged as a criticism of the neoclassical theory which 
- on the presumption that market forces and government will address harmful activities - 
postulates  that  companies  should  maximize  their  profits  (Heugenes  and  Dentchev, 
2007).  
Trough CSR companies consider the interests of society by taking responsibility 
for the impact of their activities on communities in all aspects of their operations. This 
responsibility  is  seen  to  extend  beyond  the  statutory  obligation  to  comply  with 
legislation: organizations proactively integrate the voice of parties affected by business 
activities in corporate decision making and voluntarily take further steps to improve the 
quality of life for employees and their families as well as for the society at large.  
There is no consensus on the definition of CSR. One interpretation, adopted by the 
European Commission (2001), is that CSR is ‘a concept whereby companies integrate 
social and environmental concern in their business operations and in their interaction 
with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis’. A number of alternative approaches reflect 
different views on the utility of CSR in framing the role of business in society. In line 
with the European Commission’s interpretation, many businesses understand CSR as 
encompassing  only  voluntary  activities  beyond  compliance  with  legal  requirements 
(Siegele and Ward, 2007). 
Seeing  CSR  as  a  means  rather  than  a  goal  is  the  major  argument  against  the 
proposition  that  CSR  is  irresponsible.  For  instance,  looking  at  the  environment 
management,  pollution can  be  seen  as  a  waste  of  resources  (e.g.  raw  materials are 
turned into pollution rather than products which can be sold). Thus by reducing waste 
firms  might  get  a  more  efficient  production  and  might  contribute  to  a  cleaner 
environment as well (Porter and v.d. Linde, 1995).  
The opportunity for a more effective organization of the firms’ internal use of 
resources  is  not  the  sole  explanation  for  the  rationale  behind  CSR.  The  firm  is 
dependent  on  a  number  of  core  stakeholders  whose  acceptance  and  support  is 
instrumental for its success. The firm’s incentive to incorporate stakeholders’ interests 
in its  own  policies depends on the power  of  each relevant stakeholders group. The  
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studies that have tested the effects of CSR on consumers (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001) 
and perspective employees (Greening and Turban, 2000) have not come to conclusive 
results. 
The relationship between corporations and environment is complex. The impacts 
that corporations have on the environment include the use of primary resources to make 
products:  the  use  of  energy  and  water  and  the  production  of  waste  and  emissions. 
Moreover, the impact of the use of their products on the environment is not negligible.  
Environmental  law  cannot,  and  should  not,  prescribe  every  decision  taken  by 
every business. Rather, consideration of environmental issues – the direct and indirect 
environmental impacts of the business and the risks and opportunities associated with 
them, should be part of good business practice. 
Socially  responsible  initiatives  for  the  most  part  are  welcomed  by  employees, 
consumers, investors, regulators and the public. But is it really socially desirable for 
managers to take on costly environmental initiatives that are not required by law?  
The notion of CSR, as said above, means different things to different people. We 
define environmental CSR environmentally friendly actions going beyond compliance 
to what is required by laws and regulations.  
Perhaps  pollution  is  symptomatic  of  broader  production  inefficiencies,  and 
pollution  reduction  and  cost  reduction  go  hand-in-hand  to  create  “win/win” 
opportunities.  An  environmentally  responsible  firm  expects  to  enhance  revenues. 
Because  of  world-wide  focus  on  environment,  consumers  are  demanding  more 
environmentally friendly manufacturing and packaging of products and, in some cases, 
willing to pay extra for products whose social and environmental credentials are clear to 
them. Perhaps firms are simply responding to this shift. Or perhaps business has become 
savvier  about  the  workings  of  the  political  system,  taking  pro-active  steps  to  avert 
political  conflict  rather  than  reacting  to  public  pressure  after  the  fact  (Lyon  and 
Maxwell, 2008). 
A  reputation  for  being  environmentally  considerate  can  enhance  a  company’s 
image in the eyes of consumers and improve its relations with regulators. Poor corporate 
performance is often targeted by local community and customer activists because of its 
associated  negative  externalities,  and  non-compliance  with  environmental  laws  can 
elicit coercive pressure in form of penalties imposed by government regulators. 
An environmentally responsible strategy has both benefits and costs associated 
with it. Curcio and Wolf (1996) argue that the latter have been often emphasized while  
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the former have been discounted or completely ignored. Potential benefits accruing to 
an environmentally responsible firm can be categorized as: 1) lower operating costs, 2) 
lower  cost  of  capital,  3)  decreasing  in  regulatory  risk  resulting  from  change  in 
environmental regulation and 4) enhanced revenues. 
Lower operating costs can be the result of a number of factors. Firms that have 
chosen an environmentally proactive strategy may be able to decrease costs associated 
with employees. It may be possible to reduce insurance premiums related to employee 
disability  and  worker  compensation  insurance.  A  more  environmentally  correct 
behaviour may translate into the ability of a firm to attract highly qualified workers 
while decreasing turnover, recruiting and training costs. The possibility of litigation and 
that of environmental accidents are reduced. 
Reducing  externalities  affects  the  firm  capacity  to  obtain  credit.  Lenders  and 
rating agencies scrutinize a firm’s environmental record, responsibility and risk. A firm 
found environmentally deficient is thought to face potentially substantial fine and/or to 
bear large expenditures to comply with regulation. These expenditures could make the 
firm unprofitable or result in insolvency. A more environmentally responsible firm will, 
all other things equally, receive a higher credit rating. 
According  to  Heal  (2007),  companies  that  reduce  the  potential  for  conflict 
between  themselves  and  the  rest  of  society  by  reducing  external  effects  may  be 
rewarded  by  the  stock  market,  which  seems  averse  to  companies  with  bad 
environmental records. They may avoid the attentions of socially responsible investors, 
whose boycotting of stocks seems to be capable of producing undervaluation, and also 
avoid the attention of shareholder activists. 
Being  environmentally  conscientious  might  involve  investments  in  technology, 
methods,  tools,  and  raw  materials  that  are  higher  than  is  the  case  for  the 
environmentally  indifferent.  However,  it is  also  claimed  that  these  investments  will 
bring  advantages  in  a  number  of  ways,  resulting  in  increased  profits  in  the  end
8. 
Accordingly,  adopting  environmentally  conscious  behaviour  becomes  a  source  of 
technological  innovations  that  brings  advantages  to  companies  as  well  as  society 
(Cetindamar and Husoy, 2007). 
                                                
8 Porter and van der Linde (1995) provide numerous examples of firms that increased their resources use 
efficiency, reducing pollution and costs at the same time.  
10 
Firm’s sunk investments constrain its subsequent actions, and hence the actions of 
its competitors
9 and of regulators. As we will see in the next section, corporate leaders 
may  strategically  commit  to  modest  environmental  improvements  that  constrain 
regulators’ ability to set tough standards. A firm’s sunk investments make it very costly 
to re-tool and achieve more substantial improvement in environment quality, so if the 
regulator cares about industry profits as well as environmental performance, he will set 
a weak standard so as not to dissipate profits too much.  
On the one hand the private sector generally prefers the flexibility of self-designed 
standards. On the other hand regulation in itself is unable to cover every aspect of detail 
in a corporation’s process.  
Summarizing, CSR can potentially decrease production inefficiencies, and at the 
same  time  allow  companies  to  increase  sales,  increase  access  to  capital  and  new 
markets.  Some  activities  result  in  an  immediate  cost-saving,  other  activities  bring 
reputational  benefits  to  the  company  which  increase  both  profitability  and  market 
valuation in the long-term or dissuade future action by Government which might impose 
significant costs on the company.  
 
4. The voluntary agreements  
The  literature  distinguishes  several  types  of  voluntary  agreements  (VA):  unilateral 
commitments  (aiming  to  reduce  pollution  without  any  obligation)
10,  negotiated 
agreements (that is individual negotiations between regulator and either a firm or an 
industry),  and public  voluntary schemes (schemes in which environmental  regulators 
define a program with requirements concerning commitments, deadlines and rewards). It 
is clear that in each of them the degree of involvement by the public sector is different.  
A firm adopts a VA only if it raises its profits. Therefore, the adoption of a VA is 
accompanied by a shift in either the demand or supply curve or both. 
Brau e Carraro (2004) distinguish between demand-side and supply-side incentives 
to adopt voluntary agreements. This distinction helps to identify which economic factors 
favour the adoption of voluntary agreements and affect their environmental effectiveness 
and economic efficiency. 
                                                
9 As one might expect, the level of competition in a market affects the amount of environmental CSR firms 
undertake.  
10 The term self-regulation refers to unilateral commitments which consist of environmental improvement 




4.1 Incentives to adopt Voluntary Agreements: the demand side 
In models of VAs where the demand effect is predominant, the participation motive is to 
capture  the  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  for  environmental  attributes  of  a  firm’s 
product. VAs become a differentiation strategy. Obviously this explanation is only valid 
under  imperfect competition  conditions,  where firms can  affect  the  industry  demand 
schedule,  and  when  consumers    -  which  value  a  clean  environment  in  their  utility 
function - are ready to pay a higher price for non-polluting goods or goods produced 
using a clean technology. Hence, market demand shifts upward when “clean” products 
are sold in the market. This increases firms’ profits, thus providing them an incentive to 
voluntarily carry out emission abatement. 
The demand curve is also steeper for any output level. Hence, in the presence of 
green consumers, firms can increase their market prices without suffering excessive 
demand reductions; they increase their market power. 
Cases  where  consumer’s  environmental  preferences  affect  the  industry  market 
demand for a homogeneous good are analysed by Garvie (1999) in order to identify the 
conditions  under  which  voluntary  regimes  are  likely  to  be  a  viable  alternative  to 
mandatory regimes. His model deals mainly with unilateral commitments and includes 
the two market demand shift and increased slope effects briefly discussed above. Garvie 
analyses the behaviour of (identical) firms involved in a competition à la Cournot and 
coping with a market characterised by the presence of green consumerism (consumers’ 
preferences are assumed to be separable into product and environmental characteristics). 
The consumers’ willingness to pay - or the inverse demand curve of consumers that care 
about environmental consequence of production - for a pollution generating good Q is 
given by the following relationship: 
( ) ( ) ) ( , Z MD Q f Z Q P - =  
where Z is the level of pollution emitted during the production process and  MD(Z) is 
the  monetized  value  of  the  environmental  damage  caused  by  an  additional  unit  of 
pollution. The “green” consumer’s willingness to pay for a product is decreasing in the 
level of consumption, Q, due to the diminishing marginal benefits of consumption, and 
decreasing in the level of pollution generated by the industry.  
When at least one firm improves its environmental performance, industry demand 
shifts outwards. The author assumes that consumers perceive only a fraction of the total 
environmental  damage  resulting  from  the  production  process,  with  the  two  polar  
12 
situations  of  zero  and  total  information  as  special  cases.  The  more  consumers  are 
informed, the larger the market demand outward shift induced by a voluntary emission 
reduction, and the steeper the demand curve. Given the presence of demand effects, 
firms  will  use  both  their  production  and  emission  reduction  decisions  as  strategic 
variables. 
From  this  theoretical  framework  it  emerges  that  voluntary  abatement  is  an 
increasing function of consumers’ sensitivity to environmental variables. The optimal 
firms’ damage abatment is equal to zero only if consumers attribute no value to the 
environmental damage caused by the production of the good. When consumers have a 
partial  awareness  of  environmental  damage,  firms’  abatement  is  sub-optimal  with 
respect to the socially optimal abatement level.  
Market power is  enhanced when VAs  are  adopted, therefore these agreements 
have anticompetitive effects. Market structure affects social welfare: More concentrated 
industries, where co-ordination among firms can be achieved more easily, can guarantee 
higher environmental effectiveness as well as higher economic efficiency. 
Examples of a generalization of the basic industry-wide demand effect are given by 
cases in which VAs are also used as a means to increment consumer sensitivity to a 
firm’s environmental performance. In other words, VAs can be considered as a way to 
increase a firm’s reputation vis à vis imperfectly informed consumers, which associate 
an additional value to environmentally friendly products or processes, but are unable to 
assess the quality of the products they purchase. 
Possible solutions to this asymmetric information problem depend on the firms’ 
strong incentives to build a green reputation for their goods. Such incentives enable 
consumers  to  evaluate  the  environmental  quality  of  a  product  from  a  given  period 
onwards. As pointed out by Cavaliere (2000), two cases correspond to this situation: a) 
a firm’s environmental performance is an ‘experience good’, that is to say individuals 
can infer the environmental quality of a good when consuming it; b) environmental 
quality becomes ‘common knowledge’ once some form of a publicly recognised VA is 
adopted. 
Indeed, in the latter case, in which environmental quality is a ‘credence good’, that 
is to say a situation where the environmental impact of a product cannot be ascertained 
either  by  purchasing  it,  the  adoption  of  a  VA  enables  firms  to  acquire  a  reputation 
otherwise impossible to reach.   
13 
Cavaliere (2000) presents a model with repeated interactions between a monopolist 
and a large number of uninformed consumers. In the model, the main result regarding the 
firm’s behaviour is that, if the firm characterises its type as a high quality one, it will find 
optimal to produce a high quality good in every period. If the firm characterises its type 
as a low quality one, it will randomize its production between a ‘green’ or a ‘brown’ 
good at least in the first periods of the repeated game.  
Consumers’ sensitivity to environment quality may also provide a firm with an 
incentive to increase its own demand and market share vis à vis its competitors. This can 
be done by differentiating its own product with respect to those offered by competitors, 
thus creating a niche market where a higher market price can be imposed. 
This point is formally shown, for example, by Arora and Gangopadyay (1995). 
The two authors propose an economic model of overcompliance - that relies on the fact 
that consumers value environmental quality - in which firms play a two stages oligopoly 
game where they can signal "greenness". If consumers prefer to buy products from a 
"greener" firm, then the cost of being environmentally friendly  may  be justified  by 
higher revenues. Firms first choose a level of environmental clean-up and then engage 
in price competition.  
Firms differ in their cost of environmental clean-up. Consumers with different 
incomes have different willingness to pay for cleaner products. Consumers differ in 
their marginal utilities of income.  
Arora  and  Gangopadhyay  show  that  under  these  assumptions  the  market  is 
segmented by income levels and the firm with the lower cost of clean-up over complies. 
They assume that the firms’ environmental technology is observable by consumers and 
this allow them to choose the clean firm.  
More generally, environmental soundness of a product is usually unobservable by 
consumers.  Where  mandatory  self-reporting  schemes  exist  the  truthfulness  of  firms’ 
claims remains questionable. Moreover, the observed incidence of overcompliance goes 
far beyond cases where mandatory self-reporting schemes exist. The presence of poorly 
informed consumers forces firms to adopt VAs, that is to voluntarily over comply to 
signal their friendliness with environment. 
 
When firms can choose their emission technology, in equilibrium there will be two 
types of firms in the market, one with high and the other one with low emissions per 
unit of output. Lutz, Lyon and Maxwell (2000) generalise these findings to the case in  
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which consumers do not have complete awareness of the environmental benefits. The 
VA  can  be  seen  as  the  choice  by  the  “greener”  firms  to  engage  in  non-mandatory 
abatement  levels,  while  the  less  environmental  efficient  firm  will  simply  meet  the 
already existing standards. 
Product differentiation models can constitute a useful starting point for an analysis 
of how VAs perform when ‘command and control’ or other ‘economic’ environmental 
policy  tools are also adopted by  a regulator. According to Arora and Gangopadyay 
(1995) and Lutz et al. (2000), in cases in which consumers’ tastes are heterogeneous 
and  products  are  differentiate,  the  use  of  an  effective  minimum  standard  is 
recommended. Intuitively, the ‘worst’ firm wants to move as little as possible from its 
optimum and, as a consequence, will meet the mandatory standard exactly. Then, in 
order  to  maintain  product  differentiation,  the  best  firm  will  overcomply  with  the 
standard.  
In cases in which consumers are not able to directly assess the ‘green’ nature of 
the good they purchase, we should expect that some goods would find their way onto 
the market pretending  to be ‘green’, even though they are not, thus bringing about 
adverse selection like market failures.  
A situation in which markets are oligopolistic and products are differentiated can 
actually favour the emergence of environmental VAs. In this setting, VAs become a 
form of ‘strategic social  corporate responsibility’ (Bagnoli and Watts,  2003), where 
differentiation is aimed at increasing profits.  
The consequence is that firms’ profits can increase, but higher prices may reduce 
the  consumers’  surplus,  thus  partly  offsetting  the  environmental  benefit  achieved 
through the voluntary adoption of a clean technology.  
 
4.2. Incentives to adopt voluntary agreements: The supply-side 
Intuitively, the adoption of a VA has a cost but, once in force, the improved efficiency 
brought  by  it,  determines  a  decrease  of  the  firm’s  overall  production  costs.  A  VA 
adoption may therefore bring about a downward shift of the firm’s (and market) supply 
curve 
The main cases in which this effect occurs are when VAs are aimed at shaping 
regulatory activities and obtaining savings in the cost of firm’s inputs or in the use of 
them.  
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 The first case is sometimes referred to as a regulatory gain, identifiable in the 
larger profits accruing to firms from avoiding the costs of some form of environmental 
regulation (the so-called regulatory threat). In particular, by signing a VA, firms can 
avoid or postpone the introduction of more costly regulations, or weaken the pressure 
from existing or forthcoming public intervention policies (Brau and Carraro, 2004). 
Another category of supply shifts not related to any regulatory threat is linked 
instead to the so-called ‘saving inputs’ effect (OECD, 1999). This term refers to the 
increased efficiency of the overall production process which can be associated with the 
adoption of a voluntary environmental code. In other words, firms adopting a VA may 
consequently learn to optimise their production process or acquire information about 
best available technologies. 
A VA adoption by firms with low abatement costs could be directed to ‘inducing 
regulation’. Suppose that a firm can reduce pollution more cheaply than other firms in 
its industry and thereby can contribute to improved air quality at a lower cost than its 
rivals. In this case its executives might wish to bring about a situation in which all of the 
industry’s firms have to reduce pollution so that costs increase for all of them. This 
forces  less  efficient  firms  to  exit  the  market.  A  way  to  do  this  is  to  encourage 
government authorities to force collective action (Reinhardt, 1999). The efficient firm 
gains therefore more market shares for itself.  
In other words, a way for firms to reconcile increased provision of environmental 
quality  and  increased  profits  is  to  persuade  government  regulators  to  constrain 
competitors’  behaviour.  Here  the  relevant  literature  is  that  on  rent-seeking 
(Krueger,1974). 
In other cases, a VA could promote the conditions for collusion among firms. 
Firms might adopt a VA because they value this option as the most appropriate 
way  of  minimising  the  costs  associated  with  the  regulatory  decisions  of  public 
authorities. The baseline assumption is that, by reducing emissions through a voluntary 
action, firms reach a given objective at lower costs than in circumstances where they are 
forced to meet a compulsory standard (OECD, 1999). 
There exist several explanations for why a voluntary regime can be less costly for 
both firms and the public sector. They include the greater flexibility associated to VAs 
in implementing environmental targets and the reduction in the size of transaction costs 
as a consequence of shared uncertainty between firms and public authorities (Glachant, 
1999).  
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Another possible scenario is when a well chosen abatement level can definitively 
pre-empt a regulatory intervention that would have imposed a tighter standard. 
The  literature on voluntary agreements proposes both theoretical examples where 
firms use VAs to pre-empt a stricter regulation that they cannot influence and models in 
which firms can also influence the severity of the regulatory threat.  
In a model introduced by Segerson and Miceli (1998) the regulatory threat comes 
in the form of a mandatory regulation. This model considers the strategic interaction 
between a single firm and a regulator initially entitled to makes a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer to the firm while being subject to the constraint of maximising social welfare. The 
opposite case where the firm has all the bargaining power and makes a take-it -or-leave-
it offer to the regulator is considered as well. 
The model aims to determine whether a VA to reduce pollution is likely to be 
successfully negotiated, and, if so, what the equilibrium level of abatement under the 
agreement  would  be  under  alternative  assumption  regarding  the  allocation  of  the 
bargaining power between parties. The results suggest that, given the potential savings 
under  a  VA,  such  an  agreement  will  always  be  the  equilibrium  outcome  of  the 
interaction between the firm and the regulator. 
However, the level of abatement upon which the parts agree will depend on: the 
allocation of bargaining power between the regulator and the firm and on the magnitude 
of the regulatory threat anticipated by the firm. 
According to the authors, a negotiated agreement is “a good thing” for the society 
because it is assumed that transaction costs for the public side are lower under the 
voluntary regime, and because the establishment of a mandatory standard is conditional 
on the uncertain intervention by a legislative assembly.  
The agreement is potentially profitable for the firm as well, because it can pre-
empt the legislative standard and because the hypothesis of lower transaction costs is 
also made for industry. Hence, on the whole, unitary costs of pollution reduction are 
lower when an agreement is signed. 
In Maxwell et al. (2000) a firm chooses whether to voluntarily abate its impact on 
environment  in  order  to  pre-empt  stakeholders  (e.g.  consumers)  and  the  regulator’s 
intervention; to influence the regulator’s intervention to its own advantage; to improve 
competitiveness  with  respect  to  other  firms.  The  model  is  structured  as  a  non-
cooperative  three-stages  game  and  firm  achieves  these  objectives  sequentially.  The 
endogenization of the severity of the regulatory threat is modelled in the second stage as  
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an influence game played between firms and consumers, with the latter favouring a 
stricter regulation and ready to ‘activate the game’ if the total cost of lobbying is smaller 
than the expected benefit in terms of stronger mandatory abatement levels. The payoff 
of the influence game is the definition of a mandatory abatement level to be added to the 
voluntary one. The total emission reduction achieved by the firms is thus the sum of the 
two components. 
When  firms  self-regulate,  they  reduce  consumers’  incentives  to  undertake 
lobbying activities, but must also compare the advantages of VAs vis à vis the gains 
from their lobbying activities. Different hypotheses can be made about the costs and 
benefits of these activities. It is usually recognised that industries have a competitive 
advantage in the environmental policy arena, because lobbying costs are directly related 
to the number of components of the pressure group (due to organisational problems).  
The two authors show that, within the influence game, the level of mandatory 
abatement is lower than when no lobbying activity is undertaken, but also argue that the 
VA option is even more cost effective in reducing mandatory requirements. A firm may 
offer a VA which makes it unprofitable for consumers to engage in the influence game. 
Self-regulation by firms would therefore primarily be instigated by the aim of ‘keeping 
stakeholders quiet’. 
When considering the costs of regulatory capture activities for both consumers and 
firms, pre-emption of the influence game Pareto-dominates the case when the influence 
game is played. The fact that it can actually be played indicates the occurrence of a 
prisoner’s dilemma situation. 
VAs  can  be  a  strategic  variable  through  which  firms  can  affect  regulation. 
Regulatory  gains  arise  from  the  avoidance  of  lobbying  conflicts  or,  at  least,  from 
making  these  fights  less  intense.  Given  that  the  latter  can  usually  be  seen  as  an 
unproductive expense, this is another argument in favour of Vas (Brau and Carraro, 
2004). 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Starting from the idea that the wish of a part of firms to assume - beyond their economic 
responsibilities - a social responsibility appears to be ambiguous, in this paper we asked 
why firms should be considered socially responsible, if new responsibilities give rise to 
additional production or transaction costs in the short term.  
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In order to find an answer to this question we surveyed two strands of literature. 
The survey, even if incomplete, allow us to say that when the relationship between 
business  and  society  is  considered,  companies  face  a  conflict  of  aims  between 
maximizing shareholder and stakeholder value. On the one hand, social responsibility 
might help to meet objectives that produce long-term profits, on the other hand it might 
be a step towards a better society. 
The existent differences between the private and social costs of making and using 
products and services can generate conflicts and can often be costly and damaging to the 
corporation. 
Corporations go beyond what is legally required by laws and regulations in force, 
to internalize external effects - something that they find in their long-term interests 
because it reduces the sources of conflict between them and society. The external costs 
transferred on the stakeholders have financial repercussions in the long term. Thus the 
motivation for certain firms to voluntary reduce their external costs is derived from an 
understanding of their best interests.  
CSR proponents argue that there is a positive relationship between CSR activities 
and corporate performance for reasons such that the costs are small while the benefits 
are potentially large. A good reputation is thought to translate into improved sales and 
profitability or higher stock price and a bad reputation into their opposite. Firms will act 
in a socially responsible manner in order to maintain positive reputations among the 
public, proponents argue. They will choose to do what is economically in their best 
interests.  
There is reason to question the strong rationality that CSR proponents attribute to 
firms. Firms, as individuals, have a bounded rationality. It is not self-evident that if the 
posited incentives exist, firms will necessarily choose to act upon them. On the other 
hand, choices under uncertainty could induce the firm to consider doing what others do 
the safest strategy. The CSR firm’s assumption could be the consequence of an imitative 
process.  
Anyway, as we said, the voluntary nature of CSR measures implies that they are 
less comprehensive than State regulation, as they rely on the “enlightened self-interest 
of companies” to pursue action in support of their goal. 
The moral, political and economic arguments for CSR analyse this latter from a 
social  perspective,  i.e.,  focusing  on  the effects  on  society.  Moral arguments mainly 
concern  the  question  whether  business  should  contribute  to  social  welfare,  whereas  
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political and economic arguments concern the question how, and under what conditions 
business  will  contribute  most  to  it  at  the  aggregate  level.  In  contrast,  ethical  and 
financial incentives usually explain CSR from a company perspective. Such incentives 
are useful to analyse the reasons why business engage in CSR, but less so to analyse the 
aggregate impact of CSR initiatives on society. 
Both CSR and Vas are strategic for a firm. To adopt a CSR initiative consists in 
going beyond the existent law and regulations. Probably it is just a strategy that aims to 
increase profits but it might be a self-interested illuminated initiative.  
To adopt a unilateral voluntary agreement might be considered a CSR practice. A 
firm  behaving  as  a  rent-seeker  that  tries  to  reconcile  increased  provision  of 
environmental quality and increased profits by persuading government regulators to 
constrain competitors’ behaviour is not too socially responsible.  
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